LOCAL JUDGES BEHAVING BADLY, TOO

For the past few months this column has be reporting on the outrageous decisions that have reduced “property rights” to a mere privilege that may be revoked by the government at will. During that time, the U.S. Supreme Court has driven more nails into the coffin of property rights with such decisions as Kelo v. New London (cities can take your home and give it to another private party who pay more taxes) San Remo Hotel v. San Francisco (city can charge property owners for removing rental units from housing market) and Lingle v. Chevron (rent control need not substantially advance a legitimate state interest).

The most controversial of the decisions stated above is Kelo v. New London because in that case government no longer limited itself to taking of property from “landlords” and other commercial property owners but expanded its power into to taking private homes as well. These recent decisions don’t surprise me because I discovered long ago that the courts do not protect property rights and I never expected them to make a distinction between taking commercial property and private homes. However, the “taking” of property rights is not limited to the big court decisions that make headlines because local judges also have little respect for property rights or the rule of law, as this Story demonstrates.

Once upon a time, there was a Santa Monica owner with the approximate name of Jack Bell, who had a tenant with the approximate name of Rhonda Crocker who moved into the premises in 1976 with her 7-year old son, who had an approximate name of Albert Stepson. In September 2003, the tenant bought a house and moved there, and leaving the Santa Monica rental unit to her son, who was 35 years old by the time she vacated.

When “landlord” Jack Bell found out that the tenant moved out and left her son behind, he did everything possible to make it clear that he did not accept the son as a tenant. He refused to accept any rent as soon as he found out that Rhonda Crocker was gone and filed an eviction action. He refused to put the son’s name on the building directory. He refused to communicate with the son who began demanding that repairs be made to the unit.

This should have been a simple case because the Santa Monica Rent Control Law does not permit children to inherit rental units when the parent vacated the unit unless “the tenant vacates the unit due to death or incapacitation.” This is established by Rent Control Law Section 1806 (b), which states:

“Notwithstanding any contrary provision in this Section or in the rental housing agreement, if the tenant’s spouse, child(ren), and/or domestic partner. . . have lived in the unit for at least one year at the time the tenant vacates the unit due to death or incapacitation, the landlord is prohibited from taking any action to obtain possession of the unit from the tenant’s spouse, child(ren) and or registered domestic partner on the ground that the spouse’s child(ren) and or registered domestic partner are not authorized to occupy the unit.” [Emphasis added]

The eviction case went before a local judge with the approximate name of Linda Leftwingwitz. The “landlord” did such a good job of establishing that he never accepted Albert Stepson as his tenant, that the tenants’ attorney did not even bother to argue that Albert Stepson was a tenant or subtenant. In fact, the tenant’s attorney argued that Albert Stepson was not a tenant but that he could keep living in the unit in the unit because of the “mother and son situation.”

The tenant’s attorney also requested that the trial court issue an oral statement of decision, but the Judge said that she was too busy at the time and would call the parties back and make a statement of decision later. Unfortunately, the Judge never called the parties back and never made a statement of decision. Instead, she issued a decision the following day which found in favor of the tenant and without giving any reason for coming to that conclusion.

The landlord appealed the decision to the Los Angeles Appellate Department of the Superior Court, but unfortunately he got stuck with the panel of judges, McKay, Wasserman and Weintraub, sometimes known as “The Three Stooges” because of rendering absurd decisions that border on slapstick comedy. On March 22, 2005, they issued a decision which included the following findings.

First, the Decision found that the Trial Court did not need to issue a statement of decision, even though the reporter’s transcripts established that the trial court judge agreed to do so on the record and in open court. It reasoned that since the request was made “after the matter was taken under submission” the trial court was not required issue a statement of decision, even though it agreed to do so. Therefore, there was no remand back to the trial court so that the judge could explain the reasons for her decision.

Second, the Decision found that the rental agreement did not require that the tenant actually use the apartment as her residence, even though the rental agreement said that the unit was rented “for use as a residence.” The Decision came to this conclusion at page 7 lines 9-24:

Contrary to appellant’s [i.e., the landlord’s] primary contention, the written agreement does not require Crocker to use the premises as her “principal or only residence.” Rather, the contract language, as used in the rental agreement, is ambiguous and subject to interpretation. The language, as used in the rental agreement, could be interpreted to prohibit Crocker from using the premises for any “business” purpose. Alternatively, as urged by appellant, it could also be read as requiring Crocker to maintain the premises as her principle or only place of residence. However, applying the ordinary meaning to the words [citation omitted] we reject appellant’s interpretation, and render an interpretation in favor of Respondents [i.e., Tenants]. We note that the words “for use as a residence” ordinarily means use for habitation and not use for commercial purpose. Had appellant’s predecessor in interest intended for Crocker to reside exclusively on the premises, it would have simply said so in the lease. Thus, the fact that Crockett obtained a second home was not determinative, and did not constitute a breach of the terms of the written rental agreement in that the agreement did not require that the premises be her only residence.”

Third, the Decision found that, “. . . under both the written rental agreement and the rent control ordinance, Stepson acquired a legal right to occupy the premises.” It based this reasoning upon a 1988 rental agreement that said that Crocker was the only tenant, but two adults [i.e., the tenant and her son] were permitted to occupy the unit. The Decision explained that reasoning at page 8 lines 17-22 as follows:

“We note that the rental agreement does not specify that the named tenant, Crocker, be one of the two authorized adults occupying the premises. Moreover, there is no requirement that either of the two authorized adult occupants be named in the agreement. There was no evidence presented upon which the trial court could find that Stepson was the subtenant of his mother.”

Finally, the Court decided to raise the issue of “retaliatory eviction” although neither of the parties raised that issue on appeal. The final part of the Decision states:

“Retaliatory Eviction: This issue was not briefed by the parties. However, without deciding the matter on this ground, we note that after drawing all inferences in favor of the prevailing party, the trial court could have found on the record that respondents met their burden on proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the eviction was in retaliation for their complaint regarding the habitability of the premises.”

Thus, as Judges Moe, Larry and Curly interpret the law, the tenants might have won on an issue they never argued. Furthermore, when a landlord tries to recover a rental unit because the tenant bought a house and moved away, that could be a case of retaliatory eviction!

Returning for a moment to the primary issue raised on appeal, the Decision never discussed Rent Control Law Rent 1806 (b), which only permits the children to inherit the rental unit unless “the tenant vacates the unit due to death or incapacitation.” I repeat, the 9-page Decision never got around to discussing the issue that was raised on appeal although it addressed issues that the Parties never raised.

After receiving the absurd decision described above, Jack Bell decided that he no longer wanted to be a landlord in a land where judges refuse to follow the law to such an extent that they won’t even address the issues that were raised on appeal, so he sold all his property. Unfortunately, the new buyer found his way to my office several months later and wanted to know what he could do about additional subleasing in the same unit where tenant Crocker no longer lived. I don’t know what to tell him, because what advice can I give in a land where judges no longer pay any attention to the rule of law and no longer bother to even consider it?

As bad as the Rent Control Law is, the Judges are even worse! And if you don’t believe it, go to the Appellate Department of the LA Superior Court and read Rent Board Story BV 205491.